Across the world, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its internationally mobile students are changing the face of higher education. So much more than simply ‘fee paying students’, this cohort has laid the foundation for substantial relationships between PRC universities and their international counterparts, increased opportunities within the PRC for students and businesses of the host country, and have been a boon for local business.
Within less than a decade, over 25% of international visitors to Australia will come from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). They will account for more than 1 out of every 3 dollars spent by international visitors by 2026, totalling $26.2 billion per year – up from $9.8 billion in 2017. But according to the Australia China Business Council, Australia’s tourism industry is not ready for this boom; its ‘China Readiness’ score is only 65 points out of 100.
At the entrance to Alibaba’s headquarters in Hangzhou is a large, traditional-style Chinese painting. On closer inspection, hidden in the scene are many of the big names in tech: Steve Jobs, Mark Zuckerberg, and Bill Gates to name a few. The painting captures the essence of the Alibaba dream: to surpass the past achievements of the Western tech world, and forge the future.
The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper reflects the increasing complexity of Australia’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the need to balance trade, investment, and security. Whilst two-way trade remains strong and healthy, the PRC’s assertiveness to expand its geopolitical presence and influence in Australian politics has caused much concern and frustration for Australia.
Chinese international students in Australian universities have comeunderthespotlight in recent months. This is not surprising; there are more than 131,000 university students from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Australia, accounting for almost 40 per cent of all international students in the higher education sector.
2015 was an interesting year for Australian start-ups in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In mid-June, the Shanghai stock market collapsed, losing nearly 30 per cent and more than US$2.8 trillion in value within a month. China’s early stage venture investing market then turned from a euphoric bubble to a freezing low. But few could have guessed that merely a year later in 2016, Chinese venture capital commitments would exceed US$50 billion, nearly matching the United States for the first time.
Australia’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly complex and difficult to navigate. Recent media reports about PRC government influence in this country have demonstrated this complexity, touching on different segments of Australian society. This issue of PRC government influence peddling is not just a question of the reported influence on some sections of the political and educational elite in Australia. Of equal importance in its extent and immediacy is the targeting of Chinese-Australians with the same style of influence. This must be addressed, but it can only be tackled through engaging fully with the Chinese-Australian community.
When NSW Senator Sam Dastyari resigned from the opposition front bench in September 2016 he had broken no Australian electoral laws or any formal rules of the NSW Labor Party. Rather his resignation, for allowing an entity with alleged links to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to pay a $1,600 travel debt, was the result of a swift and vocal public backlash.
China is increasingly seen as both good and evil in the common narrative which prevails in Australia. This ambivalent feeling is reflected in the recent Lowy Institute poll which showed that while a majority of people think China is more of an economic partner than a security risk, almost half (46%) still worry that it remains a potential military threat.
Ships from the American, Indian and Japanese navies will gather in the Bay of Bengal for Malabar 2017 later this month. The wargames come six months after Canberra formally asked the Indian defence ministry to consider permitting observer status to a handful of Royal Australian Navy vessels, and mere weeks after that request was denied. The consolation reportedly offered by Delhi was that Australian officers could watch the maneuvers from the decks of the participating countries’ ships. That wasn’t the outcome Australia was after, but it’s still a small step in the right direction. While the expanded Malabar exercise was a one-time matter of contention in the Sino-Australian relationship, Canberra should continue to push for its resurrection.